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Many studies suggest the ability of the NAIC Risk-Based Capital ratio (RBC 
ratio) to predict insurer insolvency. Based on the US life insurer (insurer) data for the 
period of 2005 to 2008, this study finds explanatory variables that have a statistically 
significant relationship with the RBC ratio. Advantages of panel data over cross-
sectional and time series data analysis are exploited to make valid inference on 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. Testing for unobserved insurer and time 
effects and for dependence between these effects and the explanatory variables indicates 
the appropriateness of the fixed insurer and time effects model. Based on the ordinary 
least squares estimates, it is found that insurers’ size, capital-to-asset ratio, and return on 
capital have a statistically significant relationship with the RBC ratio. Additionally, 
health product, annuity product, opportunity, and regulatory risks of insurers are related 
to the RBC ratio. Accounting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation for a given 
insurer yields the same coefficient estimates, but increased standard errors.          
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. The Risk-Based Capital ratio 
The insurance industry in the US is under the regulation of state insurance 
commissioners, since various stakeholders will be affected if their insurers fail to meet 
obligations. There are few insolvency cases in every year, since it is very unlikely that 
the regulator will not intervene in an insurer with poor financial performance before it 
becomes insolvent. To identify problematic insurers, the regulators utilize the risk-based 
capital ratio (RBC ratio), a measure of the adequacy of an insurer’s capital relative to its 
risk of insolvency (Grace et al. 1998). The regulators are assisted by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to establish standards and best 
practices, conduct peer review, and coordinate their regulatory oversight (NAIC 2009). 
Insurers in the US file annual and quarterly financial statements, and the NAIC uses 
them to maintain and update the Financial Data Repository.      
The NAIC employs the risk-based capital (RBC) system that has two main 
components: 1) the risk-based capital formula, that establishes a hypothetical 
minimum capital level that is compared to a company’s actual capital level, and 
2) a risk-based capital model law that grants automatic authority to the state 
insurance regulator to take specific actions based on the level of impairment 
(NAIC 2009).  
The authorized control level RBC for an insurer is annually calculated and 
defined by the NAIC as the amount of required capital that the insurance company must 
maintain based on the inherent risks in the insurer’s operations. Separate RBC formulas 
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that take into account size and risk profile exist for life, health, and property/casualty 
insurers (NAIC 2009).  
An insurer’s RBC ratio is defined as 50 times the ratio of an insurer’s total 
adjusted capital to its authorized control level RBC. Basically, the RBC ratio determines 
if an insurer sustains capital that adequately meets its risk exposure. There are 5 levels 
of actions that the regulators can take based on the RBC ratios.  
1. No action is taken in the case the RBC ratio greater than 200. This means an 
insurer’s capital is deemed sufficient to support its operations and investments.  
2. Company action level: If the RBC ratio is between 150 and 200, an insurer is 
required to file a special report to the regulator. In the report the insurer must 
outline comprehensive financial plan. The failure to submit the report triggers 
the Regulatory action level. 
3. Regulatory action level: The RBC ratio of between 100 and 150 not only 
requires the insurer to file the report, but the regulator to perform necessary 
examinations or analyses. It may result in corrective order for the insurer to 
address the financial problems.  
4. Authorized control level: If the RBC ratio is from 70 to 100, the law permits 
the regulator to take control of the insurer in addition to powers provided at the 
higher action levels.  
5. Mandatory control level: The RBC ratio is less than 70, and the regulator is 
required to take the insurer under control. 
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Additionally, there is a trend test targeted on insurers with RBC ratios between 
200 and 250. A negative trend below a certain level triggers the company action 
level (NAIC 2009).  
The ability of the RBC ratio to predict insurer insolvency has been studied by 
researchers. Cummins et al. (1995) concluded that RBC ratios generally were 
significantly different for failed and surviving firms, but less than half of the firms that 
failed had RBC ratios corresponding to regulatory and company action levels in the 
property-liability insurance. Grace et al. (1998) found limited support for the hypothesis 
that the use of RBC ratios produced new information concerning insurer insolvency 
risk. We intend to make inference on relationships between a set of predictors and the 
RBC ratio of life insurers. Based on relatively new data, this study may reveal variables 
related to insolvency in the life insurance industry.  
Reviewing studies by Baranoff and Sager (2002, 2011) on capital and risks in 
the US life insurance industry gave insight to conduct our study. Among other control 
variables, Baranoff and Sager use the risk-based capital ratio as a proxy for the force of 
regulatory pressure. To make valid inference on predictors, we conduct panel data 
analysis. 
1. 2. Panel data 
Panel data consist of units that are observed across time. Units can be 
individuals, households, firms, countries, etc. If there are N units, and each unit is 
measured over T time periods, the total number of observations will be NT. We can 
distinguish between balanced and unbalanced panel data. If panel data is balanced, all 
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units include measurements in all time periods. In unbalanced panel data, all units in a 
data set have different numbers of observations due to missing values, and the total 
number of observations is not NT.  
The analysis of panel data allows the model builder to learn about economic 
processes while accounting for heterogeneity across cross-sectional units as well as for 
dynamic effects that are not detectable in cross sections (Greene 2010, 343). The 
advantages of panel data over traditional cross-sectional and time-series data sets are 
central to our study. 
According to Baltagi (1995, 2), virtually every graduate text in econometrics 
contains a chapter or a major section on the econometrics of panel data. The growth of 
applied studies and the methodological development of new econometric tools of panel 
data have been simply phenomenal since the seminal paper of Balestra and Nerlove in 
1966 (Hsiao 2006). Hsiao claims, in 1986, there were 29 studies listing the key words: 
“panel data or longitudinal data”, according to Social Sciences Citation index. By 2004, 
there were 687 and by 2005, there were 773 (Hsiao 2006). We updated information 
about a proliferation of panel data studies in recent years. In 2013, Social Sciences 
Citation index databases showed 2491 results where a title of scientific papers included 
the key word “panel data.”      
According to Hsiao, the growth of the number of panel data studies can be 
explained by three main factors: (i) data availability, (ii) greater capacity for modeling 
the complexity of human behavior than a single cross-section or time series data, and 
(iii) challenging methodology (Hsiao 2006).   
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The following are the most important of the advantages of panel data according 
to Hsiao (2006): 
1. Panel data usually provides more degrees of freedom and reduces 
multicollinearity which allows more practical inference about the model 
parameters.  
2. More sophisticated behavioral hypotheses can be tested. Panel data may allow 
controlling the effects of omitted variables given the intertemporal dynamics and 
the heterogeneity of the units. One can make more accurate inference not only 
on dynamic relationships, but also on predictions of individual outcomes given 
the pooled data.    
3. Panel data usually consists of cross-sectional and time dimensions, and it may 












2.1. Panel data regression analysis 
Regression analysis of panel data is the statistical technique considered in this 
report. In the following linear panel data regression, a double subscript is used on 
variables.  
Yit = β0 + Xit*β + uit,  
i = 1,…, N and t = 1,…, T, where i denotes units, and t denotes time periods. β0 
is the intercept, β is a M dimensional vector of slopes and Xit is the it-th observation on 
M explanatory variables. If the uit are assumed iid (0, σu
2
), ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation applies to the model. This is called a pooled model, which will be considered 
in our study.  
In regression analysis, a fundamental problem is omitted-variables bias (Greene 
2010, 346). This bias may be mitigated by taking into account unobserved 
heterogeneity. The fixed-effects and random-effects models will be applied to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. In these models, the error term is modeled as uit = αi + ɛit. 
αi is time-invariant, and is accounts for omitted variables and unobserved unit specific 
effect. ɛit denotes the regression error term, and, in the simplest case, they are assumed 
iid (0, σɛ
2
). If unobserved time specific effects exist in addition to unit specific effects, 
the error term can also be modeled as uit = αi + τt + ɛit, where τt denotes the time specific 
effect. Hsiao refers to uit as an incidental parameter, because when units, N and time 
series observations, T increase, so does the dimension of uit. A general principle of 
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obtaining valid inference of β in the presence of incidental parameters uit is to find a 
proper transformation to eliminate uit from the specification (Hsiao 2006).    
A fundamental difference between the fixed and random effects models is the 
role of the unobserved heterogeneity. For example, given only unit specific effects, 
different assumptions about the correlation between the explanatory variables, Xit, and 
unit specific constant, αi, lead to alternative specifications of regression models. If αi is 
assumed to be correlated with Xit, the fixed effects model is accepted. In the fixed 
effects model αi is a part of the intercept.  
Yit = αi + Xit*β + ɛit, ɛit ~iid(0, σɛ
2
) 
In the case of the random effects model, αi is assumed to be independent of Xit 
and act as a part of the regression error term. 
Yit = β0 + Xit*β + αi + ɛit, αi ~iid(0, σα
2
), ɛit ~iid(0, σɛ
2
) 
αi acts as an omitted variable that has been added to the model, and it affects the 
parameters in the model if correlated with the explanatory variables. If it is not 
correlated with the explanatory variables, the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are not affected.  
We introduce two approaches for estimating the fixed-effects model. The least 
squares dummy variable model (LSDV) fits the fixed effects model using dummy 
variables. LSDV is a well-known approach, since its estimates are relatively easy to 
interpret. Dummy variables account for the effects of those omitted variables that are 
specific to individual cross-sectional units but stay constant over time, and the effects 
that are specific to each time period but are the same for all cross-sectional units (Hsiao 
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1985, 29). The coefficients of dummy variables are parameters whose number increases 
as the number of units or time periods increases. This can lead to so-called incidental 
parameter problem. LSDV suffers from a substantial loss of degrees of freedom, and 
estimating (N-1) extra parameters may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity 
among regressors (Baltagi 1995, 11).  
If the number of units or time periods is very large, we may want to use the 
within group effect model that does not involve dummy variables. The within group 
estimators subtracts unit means from observations and fits the regression model on data. 
The deviation from means transformation of variables eliminates observed and 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Its disadvantage is removing time-invariant 
explanatory variables from the model, so the effects of those variables cannot be 
estimated.  
2.2. Data processing   
Data used in this study is obtained from the NAIC life insurers RBC data set 
provided by Professor Thomas W. Sager. Life insurers’ annual statements constitute the 
NAIC data set which contains cross-sections of life insurers over years 1993-2008.  
The data set is arranged in long form, so we do not need to rearrange it. Initially 
there were 18056 records on insurers’ RBC ratios. After removing insurers with RBC 
ratios which are negative or greater than 10000, the number of RBC ratio records 
reduced from 18506 to 17400.The negative and extremely large RBC ratios are possibly 
due to accounting anomalies and very small value of authorized capital (Baranoff and 
Sager 2004). Since this study focuses on the years from 2005 to 2008, we removed all 
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the records not corresponding to these years from the data set, which reduced the 
number of the RBC ratio records to 3317. The original data set was unbalanced, and it 
required us to delete observations with missing data. We need at least 2 observations 
per insurer in order to build panel data models such as a fixed effects model. Removing 
insurers with less than 2 observations with non-missing values resulted in sample data 
that included 862 US life insurers.   
2.3. Explanatory variables 
The goal of this study is to identify the variables that account for variation in the 
RBC ratio of life insurers. Life insurers’ financial statements provide a great number of 
variables. The selection of explanatory variables is guided by the results of previous 
studies that have been conducted on life insurers’ data. Baranoff and Sager (2011) was 
the main source that provided insight to establish a pool of explanatory variables. Our 
goal is to examine the significance of those variables, rather than to identify new 
variables. The variables are defined as follows. 
The RBC ratio is the dependent variable: 50 times an insurer’s total adjusted 
capital divided by its authorized control level RBC in the natural logarithm form. Total 
adjusted capital is difference between assets and liabilities. (LogRBCratio).     
Size of an insurer: the natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets is used as a 
proxy (LogATotal); 
Capital ratio: the book value of an insurer’s capital over total assets (CAP);  
A return on capital: A ratio of income to market capital (RetOnCap); 
Annuity product risk: annuity writings divided by total writings (ProdARisk); 
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Health product risk: health writings divided by total writings (ProdHRisk); 
Reinsurance: reinsurance writings divided by total writings (preinsur); 
Regulatory asset risk: regulatory asset risk divided by total invested assets 
(pRegARisk); 
Opportunity asset risk: opportunity asset risk divided by total invested assets 
(pOppARisk); 
An indicator variable for the governance structure (if stock, Ntype=1, and if 
mutual, Nype=0); 
An indicator variable for whether or not the insurer is a member of a group of 
affiliated companies (if member, Ngroup=1, and if non-member, Ngroup=0). 
The statistical software package SAS was used to obtain the descriptive statistics 
and perform regressions.  











Chapter 3  
3.1. Exploratory data analysis 
The table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables observed during a 
period of 2005 to 2008. The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
for all the variables are provided in the table.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the variables (all years combined: 2005-2008) 
 
The table shows that the number of observations is not the same for all the 
variables. Approximately, 92% of the insurers are stock companies, and 77% are 
members of groups of affiliated companies. On average, health, annuity, and 
reinsurance writings account for 29%, 17%, and 14% of total writings, respectively. It 
implies that 40% of total writings are life writings which are excluded from the set of 
predictors to avoid perfect collinearity.  













NAIC group number 
Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
Org type (1=stock) 
Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Health writings / Total writings 
Annuity writings / Total writings 
100*Mkt cap / (2*Auth cap) 
Income / Mkt capital 
Mkt capital / Total assets 
log(Total assets) 
Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 































































A pairwise correlation analysis of the predictors is conducted. Pearson 
correlation coefficients measure a linear relationship between any pair of the variables. 
A cut-off value 0.8 is used to identify highly correlated variables. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient matrix reveals that no harmful pairwise correlation exists (see 
Appendix A).   
We fit separate multiple regression models for a cross-section of the insurers in 
each year of the period of 2005 to 2008. Parameters in the models are estimated by 
means of ordinary least squares, and predictors that consistently have a statistically 
significant relationship with the RBC ratio are of interest.  
We obtained separate plots of residuals against predicted values of the RBC 
ratio for every given year. In Appendix B, a funnel-shaped pattern on residual plots 
indicates increasing error variance.  
We perform the natural logarithm transformation of the response variable in 
order to capture the error heteroscedasticity and possible nonlinearity of regression. 
After fitting multiple regression models for each year, plots of residuals against 
predicted values of the response variable show random scatter plots about 0 (see 
Appendix C). This indicates that the errors terms are homoscedastic.   
Assessment of normality requires goodness-of-fit tests such as Shapiro-Wilk, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-Von Mises, and Anderson-Darling. The null hypothesis 
is the values of the residuals are a random sample from the normal distribution. The 
tests are performed for every given year, and the p-values allow rejecting the null 
hypotheses at the 0.05 significance level. Since the sample sizes are large, even small 
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departures from normality may produce highly significant test results. Thus, we obtain 
histograms and normal probability plots of residuals to make a final decision. The plots 
in Appendix D seem to approximately indicate normality.  
The outputs for multiple regressions including the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
are presented in the Table 2. The VIF measures the inflation in the variances of the 
parameter estimates caused by multicollinearity. A cut-off value 10 is used, and the 
results suggest no harmful multicollinearity.  
The log of total assets seems not to have significant relationship with the log of 
RBC ratio in any given year. The coefficient estimates vary from negative to positive 
throughout the period. Capital to asset ratio has a uniformly significant relationship with 
the response variable, and the coefficient estimates and standard errors are similar. 
Income to capital ratio has a non-significant and negative coefficient estimate only in 
2006. Health Risk is highly significant in all years, and its coefficient estimates and 
standard errors are analogous. Annuity risk is significant only in 2007, and reinsurance 
is non-significant. Regulatory asset risk is uniformly significant, but the parameter 
estimates are not quite different. Opportunity asset risk is non-significant in all years, 
and parameter estimates are similar, except in 2005. The indicator variables for group 
membership and company structure are uniformly non-significant. We conclude that 
cross-sectional study of the insurer data may lead to different estimates and decisions on 
parameters in different years. This can be due to bias caused by omitted variables, thus 
panel data analysis is conducted to investigate relationships between RBC ratio and 
predictors while controlling for the unobserved insurer and time specific effects. 
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3.2. A pooled model 
A pooled regression model, which assumes a constant intercept and slope for all 
the insurers, is considered first. It is basically an ordinary least squares regression 
model.  
LogRBCratioit = β0 + β1*LogATotalit + β2*CAPit + β3*RetOnCapit + 
β4*ProdARiskit + β5*ProdHRiskit + β6*Preinsurit + β7*pRegARiskit + β8*pOppARiskit + 
β9*Ngroupit + β10*Ntypeit + ɛit. 
In the proposed regression equation, β0 is the intercept, βi is a slope of the i-th 
explanatory variable, and ɛit is the error term.  
Model Description 
Estimation Method Pooled 
Number of Cross Sections 862 





SSE 1475.1144 DFE 3217 
MSE 0.4585 Root MSE 0.6772 






Variable DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Label 
Intercept 1 6.018891 0.1370 43.93 <.0001 Intercept 
LogATotal 1 -0.00108 0.00647 -0.17 0.8670 log(Total assets) 
CAP 1 2.144223 0.0638 33.59 <.0001 Mkt capital / Total assets 
RetOnCap 1 0.073528 0.0107 6.90 <.0001 Income / Mkt capital 
ProdHRisk 1 -0.84696 0.0382 -22.20 <.0001 Health writings / Total writings 
ProdARisk 1 0.116486 0.0506 2.30 0.0213 Annuity writings / Total writings 
Preinsur 1 -0.24586 0.0425 -5.78 <.0001 Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
pRegARisk 1 -6.24044 0.4390 -14.21 <.0001 Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 
pOppARisk 1 -2.57298 3.8010 -0.68 0.4985 Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
Ngroup 1 0.0644 0.0314 2.05 0.0406 Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Ntype 1 0.011922 0.0456 0.26 0.7938 Org type (1=stock) 
 
Table 3C: Proc Panel output of the pooled model   
R-Squared is equal to 0.40 which means the pooled model accounts for 40.1 % of 
the total variance in the response variable. Size, opportunity asset risk, and governance 
type turn out to be variables that do not have statistically significant relationships with 
the response variable.  
This model is considered a naive model, since the RBC ratio may be affected by 
unobserved insurer heterogeneity and time-specific effects in addition to the 
explanatory variables. Disregarding control for these effects may cause invalid 
inference on the model parameters. We estimate a fixed-effects as well as random-




3.3. A fixed-effects model 
There are several approaches to fit a fixed-effects model. One of them is the 
least squares dummy variable method which we can employ using PROC PANEL in 
SAS. To avoid perfect collinearity between parameters PROC PANEL drops one 
dummy variable from a model, but a parameter for the variable is estimated as the 
intercept of the model.  
To control for and test the time-invariant heterogeneity among insurers, we 
estimate a one-way fixed firm effects model. We fit a multivariate regression model 
with fixed firm effects, LogRBCratioit = β0 + β1*LogATotalit + β2*CAPit + 
β3*RetOnCapit + β4*ProdARiskit + β5*ProdHRiskit + β6*Preinsurit + β7*pRegARiskit + 
β8*pOppARiskit + αi + ɛit, where the αi are dummy variables for firm effects. It includes 
dummy variables for each insurer except the last one, which becomes the intercept.  
Model Description 
Estimation Method FixOne 
Number of Cross Sections 862 




SSE 209.9096 DFE 2356 
MSE 0.0891 Root MSE 0.2985 





F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
861 2356 16.49 <.0001 
 
Table 4C 
Variable DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Label 
LogATotal 1 0.190349 0.0263 7.25 <.0001 log(Total assets) 
CAP 1 2.666397 0.0931 28.65 <.0001 Mkt capital / Total assets 
RetOnCap 1 0.049068 0.00629 7.80 <.0001 Income / Mkt capital 
ProdHRisk 1 -0.36288 0.0990 -3.67 0.0003 Health writings / Total writings 
ProdARisk 1 -0.31828 0.1130 -2.82 0.0049 Annuity writings / Total writings 
Preinsur 1 0.011783 0.0619 0.19 0.8492 Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
pRegARisk 1 -8.31211 0.5491 -15.14 <.0001 Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 
pOppARisk 1 -0.88275 1.8900 -0.47 0.6405 Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
Ngroup 1 0.004517 0.0636 0.07 0.9434 Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Ntype 1 0.096805 0.2446 0.40 0.6923 Org type (1=stock) 
 
Table 4D: Proc Panel output of the fixed firm effects model  
The PROC PANEL output in SAS reports parameter estimates and one 
specification test for fixed effects. The specification test is based on the F statistic for 
the hypothesis that all fixed effects parameters are equal to 0. The F statistic is 
computed as βfSf
-1
βf/n with degrees of freedom equal to M – K. βf is the estimated n 
dimensional vector of fixed-effects parameters, and Sf
-1
 is the estimated covariance 
matrix of the fixed-effects parameters. M is the total number of observations, and K is 
the number of explanatory variables (SAS Institute Inc. 2008). The total number of 
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cross-sectional units is 862; therefore 861 dummy parameters and the intercept are 
estimated. The p-value of the F test is <.0001. It allows rejecting the null hypothesis at 
all practical levels of significance. The T tests for the effects of explanatory variables 
indicate that size, capital ratio, return on capital, health product risk, annuity product 
risk, and regulatory asset risk have significant relationships with the RBC ratio.  
We estimate the two-way fixed effects model by adding time effect dummy 
variables to the model.  
LogRBCratioit = β0 + β1*LogATotalit + β2*CAPit + β3*RetOnCapit + 
β4*ProdARiskit + β5*ProdHRiskit + β6*Preinsurit + β7*pRegARiskit + 
β8*LogpOppARiskit + αi + τt + ɛit, where the αi and the τt are dummy variables for the 
firm and time effects, respectively. Since there are 862 cross-sections and 4 time 
periods, the number of dummy parameters becomes 864. Dummy variables for the last 
insurer and the last time period are dropped from the model.  
Model Description 
Estimation Method FixTwo 
Number of Cross Sections 862 




SSE 205.7791 DFE 2353 
MSE 0.0875 Root MSE 0.2957 




F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
864 2353 16.80 <.0001 
 
Table 5C 
Variable DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Label 
LogATotal 1 0.201359 0.0264 7.64 <.0001 log(Total assets) 
CAP 1 2.677488 0.0925 28.94 <.0001 Mkt capital / Total assets 
RetOnCap 1 0.046104 0.00625 7.38 <.0001 Income / Mkt capital 
ProdHRisk 1 -0.37818 0.0981 -3.86 0.0001 Health writings / Total writings 
ProdARisk 1 -0.30369 0.1121 -2.71 0.0068 Annuity writings / Total writings 
Preinsur 1 0.014527 0.0614 0.24 0.8131 Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
pRegARisk 1 -9.025 0.5542 -16.28 <.0001 Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 
pOppARisk 1 5.733557 2.1136 2.71 0.0067 Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
Ngroup 1 0.001921 0.0630 0.03 0.9757 Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Ntype 1 0.137853 0.2424 0.57 0.5697 Org type (1=stock) 
 
Table 5D: Proc Panel output of the fixed firm and time effects model  
The F test for fixed effects is highly significant, and the null hypothesis of “no 
fixed effects” is rejected. Significance of the insurer effects is not uniform. However, 
the time effects are uniformly significant, but they are not significantly different from 
each other. Explanatory variables with significant effects in the model are the log of 
total assets, capital ratio, return on capital, health product risk, annuity product risk, 
regulatory asset risk, and opportunity asset risk. The presence of a great number of 
parameters inflates the R-Square up to 0.91. If we compare it to the two-way fixed-
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effects model, the estimates of the regression coefficients and the standard errors are 
almost identical. Only the coefficient estimate for opportunity asset risk becomes 
insignificant. 
3.4. A random-effects model 
To further investigate the effects of the explanatory variables, we consider a 
two-way random effects model.  
LogRBCratioit = β0 + β1*LogATotalit + β2*CAPit + β3*RetOnCapit + 
β4*ProdARiskit + β5*ProdHRiskit + β6*Preinsurit + β7*pRegARiskit + β8*pOppARiskit + 
Ngroupit + Ntypeit + αi + τt + ɛit, where αi is an insurer random effect, and the effects are 
iid from the distribution with the mean 0 and the variance σα
2
. Likewise, the τt, time 
random effects, have mean 0 and the variance στ
2
. The random effects model allows 
including the time-invariant explanatory variables in a regression. The output from 
PROC PANEL gives estimates of variance components for cross-sections and time 
series.  
In order to decide whether to use the fixed-effects or the random-effects model 
we can refer to the Hausman test results. A testing procedure suggested by Hausman 
(1978) notes that under H0, the generalized least squares (GLS) for a random-effects 
model achieves the Cramer-Rao lower bounds, but under H1, the GLS is a biased 
estimator. In contrast, coefficient of variation of β is consistent under both H0 and H1 
(Baltagi 1995, 68-72). Simply, the null hypothesis states the random-effects model is 




Estimation Method RanTwo 
Number of Cross Sections 862 




SSE 3027.9912 DFE 3217 
MSE 0.9412 Root MSE 0.9702 
R-Square 0.3254   
 
Table 6B 
Variance Component Estimates 
Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.564134 
Variance Component for Time Series 0.002383 
Variance Component for Error 0.087454 
 
Table 6C 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
DF m Value Pr > m 






Variable DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Label 
Intercept 1 4.906161 0.2326 21.09 <.0001 Intercept 
LogATotal 1 0.05298 0.0106 4.98 <.0001 log(Total assets) 
CAP 1 2.419074 0.0734 32.96 <.0001 Mkt capital / Total assets 
RetOnCap 1 0.047596 0.00592 8.04 <.0001 Income / Mkt capital 
ProdHRisk 1 -0.69032 0.0611 -11.30 <.0001 Health writings / Total writings 
ProdARisk 1 -0.09118 0.0773 -1.18 0.2385 Annuity writings / Total writings 
Preinsur 1 -0.07928 0.0489 -1.62 0.1053 Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
pRegARisk 1 -7.92 0.4269 -18.55 <.0001 Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 
pOppARisk 1 4.593034 2.0220 2.27 0.0232 Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
Ngroup 1 -0.02184 0.0449 -0.49 0.6265 Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Ntype 1 0.057054 0.0895 0.64 0.5241 Org type (1=stock) 
 
Table 6E: Proc Panel output of the random firm and time effects model  
The Hausman m statistic is reported in the PROC PANEL output. Given βa, a 
vector of the ordinary least squares estimates, and βb, a vector of the generalized least 




(βb - βa). Sb and Sa are consistent estimates of the 
asymptotic covariance matrices. Then m statistic is distributed χ
2
 with K degrees of 
freedom, and K is the number of the explanatory variables (SAS Institute Inc. 2008). 
The p-value of <.0001 allows rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlation between 





3.5. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors estimation   
A shortcoming of the models considered so far is accepting the OLS 
assumptions such as independence of errors across insurers and years. Cross-sectional 
dependence implies residuals of a given year may be correlated across different 
insurers. Likewise, time-series dependence of residuals may be present for a given firm. 
When the residuals are correlated across observations, OLS standard errors can be 
biased and either over or underestimate the true variability of the coefficient estimates 
(Petersen 2009). In our panel data, there may possibly be dependence between insurers 
that are members of a group of affiliated companies. Insurers that are members of an 
affiliated group of firms may have superior access to investment opportunities and may 
have different mechanisms for monitoring and/or controlling managerial performance 
and structuring their capital and asset risk (Baranoff and Sager 2008). Unfortunately, 
accounting for insurer and time effects by including dummy variables may not fully 
mitigate cross-sectional and time dependence of the residuals. Contrary to the time 
series data in which the time label gives a natural ordering and structure, general forms 
of dependence for cross-sectional dimension are difficult to formulate (Hsiao 2006). In 
this report we assume that there is no cross-sectional dependence and perform the time 
clustering to account for autocorrelation within individual insurers.  
Additionally, the assumption of homoscedasticity may not hold, because the 
residuals of large insurers tend to be larger than the residuals for small insurers. We 
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implemented the log transformation of the response variable, but the residuals of 
individual insurers still may be heteroscedastic. 
PANEL procedure in SAS provides options for the time clustering while fitting 
the two-way fixed-effects model. For example, we can obtain heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation consistent standard error estimators by Arellano (1987) for the 
parameters estimates of the least squares dummy variables model. Arellano (1987) 
considers a separate covariance matrix with unknown form for each unit in panel data. 
In Proc Panel, the covariance matrices are obtained from  separate regressions for units, 
where the intercepts correspond to the coefficients of the dummy variables for the units 
in the least squares dummy variable regression. Let’s denote the covariance matrix for i-




as the variance 
expression for the parameter estimator. The middle term, X′ΩX, is computed as the sum 
of Xi′ΩiXi for each unit. Another advantage of Arellano estimators is an assumption of 
large N, units, and small T, time periods, which is appropriate for our data. 
The two-way fixed-effects model with time clustering reports identical 
coefficient estimates as the model without clustering. The same explanatory variables 
have statistically significant relationships with the RBC ratio at the 0.05 significance 
level. However, the t-values for health product risk, annuity product risk, and 
opportunity asset risk are not highly significant in comparison with OLS estimates. This 




Estimation Method FixTwo 
Number of Cross Sections 862 
Time Series Length 4 
Hetero. Corr. Cov. Matrix Estimator 4 
Table 7A 
Fit Statistics 
SSE 205.7791 DFE 2353 
MSE 0.0875 Root MSE 0.2957 
R-Square 0.9164   
Table 7B 
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
864 2353 16.80 <.0001 
Table 7C 
LogATotal 1 0.201359 0.0745 2.70 0.0069 log(Total assets) 
CAP 1 2.677488 0.2840 9.43 <.0001 Mkt capital / Total assets 
RetOnCap 1 0.046104 0.00830 5.55 <.0001 Income / Mkt capital 
ProdHRisk 1 -0.37818 0.1890 -2.00 0.0455 Health writings / Total writings 
ProdARisk 1 -0.30369 0.1437 -2.11 0.0347 Annuity writings / Total writings 
Preinsur 1 0.014527 0.1166 0.12 0.9008 Reinsurance writings / Total writings 
pRegARisk 1 -9.025 0.9518 -9.48 <.0001 Regulatory asset risk / Total invested assets 
pOppARisk 1 5.733557 2.5266 2.27 0.0233 Opportunity asset risk / Total invested assets 
Ngroup 1 0.001921 0.1141 0.02 0.9866 Indicator for member of group (1=yes) 
Ntype 1 0.137853 0.1406 0.98 0.3269 Org type (1=stock) 
 
Table 7D: Proc Panel output of the fixed firm and time effects model  
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We find a difference between the estimation methods in terms of the estimated 
standard errors. For the Arellano estimation, the estimates are approximately two times 
larger for the size, capital ratio, health product risk, reinsurance, regulatory asset risk, 
and group member dummy variables. On contrary, the estimates of standard errors 
increased by a small amount for return on the capital and opportunity asset risk 
variables and decreased for the organization type dummy variable. 
 


























































Table 8: Comparison of two estimation methods for the firm and time fixed 
effects model 
The exponential of a coefficient estimate yields the expected change in the RBC 






In this study we utilize panel data of life insurers during the period of 2005 to 
2008 to discover variables that have statistically significant relationships with the RBC 
ratio. The use of panel data analysis is motivated by its ability to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity among the insurers and insurer-invariant time effects. 
Exploratory data analysis is conducted to check the error assumptions within each given 
year. The natural logarithm transformation of the response variable is performed to 
remedy the error heteroscedasticity across the insurers. The limitation of our study is 
that we assume no correlation between the insurers. We find the two-way fixed effects 
model has advantages over the model with only fixed firm effects. The Hausman test 
statistic indicates correlation between the fixed effects and the explanatory variables, 
thus we prefer the fixed effects model. First, the models are estimated based on the 
assumption of constant error variance and no autocorrelation for individual insurers. 
However, these assumptions probably do not hold. The Arellano method allows us to 
obtain the coefficient standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The results suggest that the RBC ratio has a statistically significant relationship with 
size and capital structure of the insurers and the relationships are positive. The increase 
in return on capital and opportunity asset risk is associated with the increase in the RBC 
ratio. Health product risk, annuity product risk, and regulatory asset risk have a negative 
relationship with the RBC ratio. Further study may focus on causal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the RBC ratio of life insurers.   
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Appendix A: The Pearson correlation matrix  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
Number of Observations 
 Preinsur Ntype Ngroup ProdHRisk ProdARisk RBCratio 
Preinsur 





























































































































































































































Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
Number of Observations 
 RetOnCap CAP LogATotal pRegARisk pOppARisk 
Preinsur 





























































































































































































Appendix B: Proc Reg residual plots versus fitted response variable for the multiple 









Appendix C: Proc Reg residual plots versus fitted response variable for the multiple 










Appendix D: The histograms and the normal probability plots of the residuals (response 
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